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Abstract 
This dissertation examines the effects of a change in the roles that extra-
academic agents have in academic research: they are participating in the 
production of academic knowledge more actively than used to be the case. 
The focus is mainly on disciplines that fall under the umbrella of cultural 
research. Former informants are nowadays often becoming collaborators, 
co-researchers or co-authors in collaborative or participatory projects, or 
conducting activist research on their own cultures.  
Cultural research is in a unique position when facing the contemporary 
urge towards more "democratic" knowledge production. In disciplines 
such as anthropology, folkloristics and ethnology, researchers have always 
interacted with their informants' knowledge systems and developed re-
search practices for approaching these systems. These practices are pres-
ently colliding with new demands that arise from the now common call for 
collaborative and participatory research. 
I focus on normative epistemic questions related to relativistic research 
practices and to objectivity. When the roles of the extra-academic agents 
change, the composition of research communities is also changed. An 
interactive notion of objectivity has recently been defended in social epis-
temology. It takes a research community as the unit whose objectivity is to 
be assessed. In the articles I identify shortcomings in the interactive objec-
tivity of the emerging research communities, and develop analytical tools 
that can hopefully be of use in improving the situation. 
As the composition of research communities is changed, the established 
ways of approaching extra-academic knowledge systems also have to 
change. The moderately relativistic practice of avoiding the appraisal of 
alien knowledge systems is no longer as practicable as it used to be. When 
former informants join research teams in participatory projects, or indige-
nous activists become activist researchers, they become part of communi-
ties whose interactive objectivity can and should be assessed. This is the 
case even if some or all of the members of the communities are taken to 
represent, or see themselves as representing, extra-academic knowledge 
systems. The contributions of everyone belonging to a research communi-
ty must be met with the same critical attitude, or the objectivity of the 
community will suffer. 
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Part I: Introductory essay 
Objective Communities and Relativistic Practices 
 
1. Changing roles in contemporary cultural research  
This dissertation consists of five articles that examine the effects of a 
change in the roles that extra-academic agents have in academic re-
search. The focus is mainly on disciplines that fall under the umbrella 
of cultural research. Former informants are nowadays often becoming 
collaborators, co-researchers or co-authors, or they are conducting 
activist research on their own cultures. The main aim of this disserta-
tion is to offer tools for cultural researchers who face the challenge of 
developing research methods and practices suitable for the new situa-
tion. I pay special attention to normative epistemic questions such as 
are raised by objectivity and by relativistic research practices. 
The change in the roles that extra-academic agents have in academ-
ic research is part of a wider process of "democratisation" that affects 
many disciplines. Collaboration with different kinds of extra-academic 
agents – for instance local communities, private enterprises, patient 
associations or indigenous people – has become common, and re-
searchers in many fields are interested in developing research practices 
that are more inclusive socially. This development has engendered 
discussions not only in the disciplines it touches, but also in science 
studies. The expertise of laypeople is being recognised, as is the im-
portance of listening to the viewpoints of stakeholders in policy-
relevant research (e.g. Epstein 1996; Nowotny, Scott and Gibbons 
2001; Jasanoff 2005; Collins and Evans 2007). Compared to science 
studies, in philosophy of science there is less literature related to the 
democratisation of scientific knowledge production, but philosophers 
have recently become increasingly interested in the topic (e.g. Kitcher 
2001; 2011; Figueroa and Harding 2003; Van Bouwel 2009; Fehr and 
Plaisance 2010; Grasswick 2010; King, Morgan­Olsen and Wong 2014; 
Froeyman, Kosolosky and Van Bouwel 2014; Wylie 2015). 
The underlying premise of this dissertation is that the emerging, 
more democratic forms of research should be objective, in the minimal  
Inkeri Koskinen 
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sense of rejecting the use of values in place of evidence (Douglas 
2007), or in the sense that "democratisation" must not promote vices 
such as disregard for criticism (Hacking 2015). 
Cultural research, especially ethnography, is in a unique position 
when facing the urge towards more democratic knowledge production. 
This is because in disciplines such as anthropology, folkloristics and 
ethnology – unlike in many other fields of inquiry – researchers have 
always interacted with how their informants conceptualise, understand, 
and explain themselves and the world around them, this usually being 
an important part of what these disciplines study. Moreover, in cultural 
research the knowledge practices or knowledge systems of the inform-
ants have typically been clearly distinct from the knowledge systems of 
the researchers: academic knowledge systems differ from, say, shaman-
istic ones. Researchers have thus developed a theoretical understanding 
of the ways in which their informants produce and justify knowledge 
claims, and introduced research practices through which these claims 
are approached. These practices are presently colliding with new de-
mands that arise from the now common call for collaborative and par-
ticipatory research. 
Collaborative and participatory research has been strongly criticised, 
along with different forms of activist research. Often the criticism is 
based on the claim that those engaging in such research are accepting 
problematic forms of relativism, and that the research conducted is 
value-laden and thus not objective. I examine the influence of diverse 
forms of relativism in cultural research. In summary: Ethnographic re-
search practices developed for approaching alien knowledge systems have been shaped 
by moderate forms of relativism. It has become customary for ethnographers to avoid 
appraising their informants' knowledge systems. As informants are now turning 
into co-researchers, this practice is becoming outdated. 
I also use certain ideas advanced in social epistemology. When the 
roles of the extra-academic agents change, the composition of research 
communities is also changed. When extra-academic agents become co-
researchers, they join a research community. When indigenous activists 
receive academic training and become indigenous activist scholars, they 
form research communities. An interactive notion of objectivity has 
Changing Research Communities 
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recently been defended in social epistemology. It takes a research 
community as the unit whose objectivity is to be assessed. In the arti-
cles I identify shortcomings in the interactive objectivity of the new, 
emerging research communities, and develop analytical tools that can 
hopefully be of use in improving the situation. To summarise: When 
former informants join research teams in participatory projects, or indigenous activ-
ists become activist researchers, they become part of communities whose interactive 
objectivity can and should be assessed. Avoiding the appraisal of alien knowledge 
systems is no longer viable. The only epistemically acceptable practice towards alien 
knowledge systems in these research approaches is critical interaction.  
Most of the disciplines I examine belong to the humanities. I do 
not take the natural sciences to be fundamentally different from the 
social sciences and the humanities. This, however, does not mean that 
that the humanities should try to mimic physics. Different subjects of 
research require different methods. And the differences between vari-
ous natural sciences – for instance, biology and physics – are also so 
great that there is no reason to emphasise the division between natural 
and human sciences (see also Hansson 2013). Many philosophical ideas 
developed with mainly natural or social sciences in mind are also fully 
applicable to the philosophical analysis of questions emerging in the 
humanities. This is especially the case with recent discussions in social 
epistemology, as research in the humanities is often strongly linked to 
social and political issues in which social epistemologists are interested. 
As Anton Froeyman, Laszlo Kosolosky and Jeroen Van Bouwel (2014) 
have recently noted, the development of the humanities "might be a 
veritable treasure chest of case studies for social epistemologists". I 
have certainly found this to be true.  
In the next section of this introductory essay I present a short over-
view of the current philosophical discussion related to collaborative 
and participatory approaches in cultural research. Then, in Section 3, I 
introduce my philosophical and conceptual tool kit. In Section 4 I spell 
out my main arguments related to relativistic research practices and 
objective research communities. Section 5 introduces the disciplines 
and research programmes I study, and in Section 6 I analyse them by 
applying the philosophical distinctions and ideas described in Section 4. 
Inkeri Koskinen 
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In conclusion, I discuss my methods briefly and give an overview of 
the articles. 
 
2. Short overview of the philosophical discussion  
When taking notice of collaborative and participatory approaches in 
different disciplines, of attempts to integrate different forms of extra-
academic knowledge with academic knowledge, or of other contempo-
rary endeavours to "democratise" academic knowledge production, 
philosophers of science are for the moment mostly set either on de-
fending them or on arguing against them. This is also the case when 
philosophers examine such developments in cultural research. Philo-
sophical discussions of collaborative and participatory approaches in 
cultural research have thus far revolved mainly around two opposite 
positions, which both derive from battling positions in the so-called 
Science Wars. As yet there is not much philosophical literature that 
would address the epistemic problems that arise from the new, emerg-
ing forms of research – without scorning such research completely. In 
this section I will give an overview of the existing discussion, and brief-
ly describe my own approach to the issue at hand. 
Social epistemologists and scientific pluralists in particular have re-
cently stressed the potential advantages of including extra-academic 
agents and knowledge in academic research. This discussion is con-
nected to the recent science studies literature on the subject. Thus 
there is a growing amount of philosophical literature on topics such as 
the expertise of "laypeople", stakeholders who should perhaps especial-
ly have their voice heard in policy-relevant research, and the epistemi-
cally important criticism that extra-academic agents might be able to 
offer researchers (e.g. Hood 2003; Solomon 2009; Fehr and Plaisance 
2010). Philip Kitcher has formulated a much discussed view on the role 
of science in a democratic society. He calls for more democratic ways 
of setting the agenda of knowledge production within academia, and 
stresses the importance of listening to the interests and perspectives of 
extra-academic agents (Kitcher 2001; 2011). However, the cases dis-
cussed in this literature are usually not taken from cultural research. 
Changing Research Communities 
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In feminist philosophy of science and postcolonial science studies, 
the idea of paying attention to knowledge held by socially marginal 
groups, or to knowledge produced in non-Western knowledge systems, 
is generally embraced (Figueroa and Harding 2003; Harding 2011; 
Wylie 2003; Crasnow 2007). The positive attitude to such knowledge is 
often based on standpoint epistemology and on the idea that some 
groups are victims of epistemic injustice. 
According to standpoint epistemologists, such oppressed groups as 
indigenous communities may be epistemically privileged in some re-
spect due to their standing in society. According to this view, our social 
location limits and shapes our knowledge. For instance, a member of a 
socially marginal group may have experiential knowledge of oppressive 
social mechanisms, while these mechanisms remain virtually invisible 
to the privileged in the same society. As academic researchers are often 
in a socially privileged position, topics that are important for the social-
ly marginalised easily remain understudied, or if they are studied, they 
are easily misrepresented. Research that aims at social neutrality may 
thus end up representing the point of view of the socially privileged. 
Researchers could therefore benefit from taking the unique standpoints 
of socially marginal groups into account (Wylie 2003; Harding 2004; 
Jaggar 2004). 
Indigenous or other socially marginal communities may also be vic-
tims of epistemic injustice. In other words, their knowledge about their 
lives and surroundings is dismissed for epistemically unfounded rea-
sons. Miranda Fricker (2007) has distinguished between two forms of 
epistemic injustice: testimonial and hermeneutical. The first takes place 
when epistemic authority is not attributed to people because of the 
social group they belong to: they could have valuable knowledge about 
an issue, but their knowledge is disregarded as they are not considered 
as possible experts. The second form, hermeneutical injustice, results 
from a failure to understand key elements of the knowledge possessed 
by a minority because of different conceptual frameworks and com-
municative practices. As King, Morgan­Olsen and Wong (2014) note, 
the second form of injustice may occur even if researchers attempt to 
collaborate with extra-academic communities. The power asymmetry 
Inkeri Koskinen 
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between the researchers and the extra-academic agents might jeopard-
ise the attempt fully to recognise the knowledge of the latter. 
Alison Wylie (2003; 2015) has recently argued in favour of collabo-
rative approaches in archaeology. She combines arguments deriving 
from social epistemology and feminist philosophy of science, and 
stresses the potential epistemic advantages of giving extra-academic 
agents an active role in the process of academic knowledge production. 
By so doing, she builds on Helen Longino's work. Among others (see 
Douglas 2009; Kitcher 1993), Longino (1990, 2002) has stressed the 
importance of critical interactions and multiple different viewpoints in 
scientific knowledge production. However, she concentrates on critical 
interaction within or between scientific or academic communities, and 
pays limited attention to extra-academic viewpoints. Wylie makes 
Longino consistent with standpoint theory by noting that extra-
academic criticism too can prove useful. "Pluralist engagement" with 
indigenous communities may be epistemically advantageous, because 
when researchers get acquainted with alternative epistemic traditions, 
they may notice problems in their own academic systems: it is possible 
that "interaction with external, alternative knowledge systems will de-
stabilise entrenched epistemic and methodological norms" (Wylie 2015, 
204). Philip Kitcher has made a similar point when envisioning more 
democratic forms of scientific knowledge production. He holds that 
extra-academic agents can offer viewpoints and criticism not otherwise 
available, and thus raise the quality of the research conducted: "Repre-
sentation of a broader set of perspectives within the scientific commu-
nity has the potential to expose ways in which the methods used by 
that community are less reliable than they are supposed, and may thus 
lead to improvements in certification" (Kitcher 2011, 150).  
 
Unsurprisingly, the sometimes overtly political forms of contemporary 
cultural research have also faced strong criticism. Especially in social 
anthropology and archaeology, collaborative and participatory ap-
proaches and indigenous activist research has raised controversy. Re-
searchers who wish to take indigenous knowledge into account in their 
work have been accused of reviving an old, essentialising image of the 
Changing Research Communities 
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"Native" and of conducting research so value-laden that it is far from 
objective (Kuper 2003; 2006; McGhee 2008).  
When philosophers have taken a critical stance towards the idea of 
extra-academic participation in cultural research, the critique is typically 
related to a perennial topic in philosophy of anthropology: relativism. 
The clearest formulation of this critique is by Paul Boghossian, who 
takes collaborative archaeology to be an example of alarming relativ-
ism. He has participated actively in the so called "Science Wars" or 
"Culture Wars", opposing social constructionist and relativistic views 
of science (e.g. Boghossian 1996). In his book on relativism (2006), he 
mentions two archaeologists as examples of "postmodern" epistemic 
relativists who supposedly advocate the "doctrine of Equal Validity". 
According to this doctrine "[t]here are many radically different, yet 
'equally valid' ways of knowing the world, with science being just one 
of them" (Boghossian 2006, 2). It is taken as possible that these radical-
ly different ways of knowing can result in clashing propositions. If the 
relativistic position Boghossian describes is accepted, there is no way to 
choose between propositions made in different knowledge systems – 
or at least the only grounds left for making the choice would be politi-
cal or otherwise value-laden. Boghossian fears that the idea of alterna-
tive, equally valid knowledge systems will lead to research that is highly 
value-laden, biased and thus not objective.  
As noted, the philosophical discussion on the use of extra-academic 
knowledge and on the participation of extra-academic agents in aca-
demic research is currently still polarised. The Science Wars are mostly 
over, and Longino, among many others, has presented a more mediate 
view on the issues over which the most heated debates ranged. Never-
theless, these debates still appear to influence the way in which the 
issue at hand is understood, and the questions that are taken to be the 
most important ones. This is shown, for instance, by the fact that 
Kitcher starts his 2011 book with a discussion of the Science Wars, 
while Wylie, who builds on Longino's work, presents her arguments as 
a response to Boghossian. 
To sum up: In the current philosophical discussion, the defenders 
of extra-academic collaboration and participation usually rely on argu-
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ments that derive from social epistemology, feminist philosophy of 
science and scientific pluralism. Those sceptical of such arguments 
worry about objectivity and relativism. In the articles I combine argu-
ments regarding relativism with a view of objectivity developed in so-
cial epistemology. While I do respond to the issues the critics raise, and 
do think that there are good reasons to defend collaborative and partic-
ipatory approaches as well as different forms of activist research, I wish 
to move on from the question whether these approaches are epistemi-
cally beneficial or not. Regardless of what philosophers say or do, they 
are becoming common in several disciplines, as well as in transdiscipli-
nary research. My aim is to develop normative, constructive criticism 
that is useful for the further development of such approaches in cul-
tural research. I identify and analyse epistemic shortcomings and offer 
philosophical tools that may hopefully be of use in correcting them. In 
the next section I briefly describe the main distinctions and ideas on 
which I build, and in Section 4 I proceed to my arguments. 
 
3. Studying emerging research approaches 
In order to move on from the polarised debates, I have studied some 
collaborative and participatory approaches that are currently emerging, 
as well as activist research. I take my examples and illustrations from 
actual cultural research. When I analyse them, I use philosophical dis-
tinctions and notions. As the philosophical audience of this work may 
be unfamiliar with the disciplines and research programmes I study, 
and folklorists, indigenous scholars, archaeologists and anthropologists 
may be unfamiliar with the philosophical ideas, I will now define the 
most important notions and distinctions I use: collaborative and partic-
ipatory approaches and activist research; the notion of knowledge sys-
tems; three different forms of relativism; the notion of epistemic 
communities; and the interactive account of objectivity. 
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3.1. Collaborative and participatory approaches and  
activist research 
A multitude of practices is included in the notions of collaboration and 
participation. Different terminology is used in different disciplinary 
contexts, and in colloquial use these words are somewhat ambiguous. 
Here I tentatively distinguish between collaborative and participatory 
research by paying attention to the strength of the role which extra-
academic agents are given during the research process. In collaborative 
research they are consulted, typically several times. They may comment 
on any part of the work conducted by researchers, and the researchers 
take the comments into account. However, they do not fully become a 
part of the research team. Participatory research, on the other hand, at 
least aims to give to the extra-academic agents the role of co-
researchers and co-authors. The aim of participation in cultural re-
search is to change the relationship between researcher and researched 
from one between subject and object to one between subject and sub-
ject (Smith 1997). Participatory projects may also attempt to integrate 
extra-academic forms of knowledge with scientific or academic 
knowledge, especially if the existence of multiple "knowledge systems" 
or "alternative epistemologies" is assumed. 
Activist research differs from participatory research, as activist re-
searchers typically belong to the community studied, or otherwise see 
themselves as representing it. There are no outsider researchers who 
would work with extra-academic agents representing the community, 
as in collaborative and participatory research; this is not necessary, 
since the academic researchers are viewed as representing the commu-
nity. Activist research is often an integral part of some overtly political, 
emancipatory movement. This is the case in the form of activist re-
search I discuss in my papers: indigenous activist research or indige-
nous studies. 
 
3.2. Knowledge systems 
The term “knowledge system” is in common use both in participatory 
research and indigenous studies, as well as in postcolonial literature. 
(Expressions such as "alternative epistemologies", "indigenous para-
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digms" and "non-Western knowledge systems" are also widely used.) 
The term is sometimes also used in pluralist philosophy of science, but 
there it typically refers to scientific or academic knowledge systems, 
and rarely to extra-academic ones. Here, I discuss both academic and 
extra-academic knowledge systems. 
In different parts of the world, people and communities have estab-
lished different ways for arriving at knowledge claims and justifying 
them, as well as different sets of shared beliefs. These can be taken to 
stem from fairly coherent knowledge systems that comprise some sta-
ble epistemic norms, of which the people who follow the system may 
be (or become) aware. Scientific knowledge systems are typically taken 
to be of this kind. Alternatively, they can be seen as more loose, tradi-
tional practices from which it may not be possible to synthesise such a 
set of norms (see Kusch 2013). Both academic and extra-academic 
knowledge systems and practices can change. They are not static. In 
some cases – for instance in interdisciplinary research – they can also 
be integrated with each other. 
In participatory research and activist research, researchers some-
times attempt to integrate extra-academic knowledge practices or sys-
tems with academic ones. In these cases, it is necessary to explicate the 
epistemic norms which thus far have perhaps remained implicit. It may 
also be necessary to stabilise loose practices into norms, at least for the 
duration of the research project in question. As I focus on such at-
tempts, I will henceforth talk about knowledge systems, and mention 
knowledge practices or epistemic practices only when necessary.1  
 
3.3. Forms of relativism 
It is not obvious that different knowledge systems can be integrated. 
They may be incompatible, but some of them can even be deemed 
incommensurable. The idea that some knowledge systems would be 
deeply incommensurable has often been linked to relativism. As noted, 
                                                      
1 In the earliest of the articles (III) I use the term "epistemic practices". There, 
however, I discuss cases where integration of knowledge systems is not at-
tempted. 
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collaborative and participatory approaches in cultural research have 
been criticised as relativistic. The same has been said of more tradition-
al cultural research, especially anthropology. 
Different forms of relativism can be described in terms of the gen-
eral schema Y is/are relative to X, where Y may be, for instance, moral 
norms, meaning, standards of rationality, or knowledge, and X is a 
frame of reference such as a culture, a language, a conceptual frame-
work or a knowledge system (Swoyer 2014). In cultural research it is 
typically assumed that people belonging to a distinct culture often 
share a language, a distinct conceptual framework, and in many cases a 
somewhat unique knowledge system or practice. Thus it is not surpris-
ing that several forms of relativism have influenced especially the de-
velopment of ethnography. 
When discussing relativism, I apply the practice-based account of 
science: I study the ways in which different forms of relativism shape 
actual research practices. Thus I focus on such forms of relativism as 
have had an important impact on practices in cultural research. 
In the articles I refer to three influential forms of relativism. To de-
fine them briefly, by cultural relativism I mean the claim that "there can 
be no such thing as a culturally neutral criterion for adjudicating be-
tween conflicting claims arising from different cultural contexts" 
(Baghramian 2010, 31). Conceptual relativism is the holistic notion that 
conceptual frameworks influence thought so strongly that "insofar as it 
is a question of truth or falsity, one cannot legitimately compare state-
ments made in one [framework] with those made within another" 
(Mandelbaum 2010, 68). In other words, when cultural relativists com-
pare statements arising in different contexts, they start from the prem-
ise that these statements can be found to conflict with each other, 
while conceptual relativists question this possibility. Epistemic relativism 
differs from conceptual relativism in a similar way: comparing state-
ments made in different frameworks is taken to be possible, but there 
is no neutral criterion for adjudicating between them. Different 
knowledge systems are deemed equally valid, even when these are mu-
tually contradictory. The form of epistemic relativism dubbed "post-
modern", mainly by its critics, can be characterised as Nietzschean: all 
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knowledge is considered to be partial, perspectival and tied to power 
structures, and there is no overarching perspective from which the 
different knowledge systems could be appraised (Baghramian 2004; 
2010; see also Boghossian 1996; 2006). 
 
3.4. Epistemic communities 
The notion of a knowledge system (as well as that of a culture or a 
conceptual framework) typically includes the idea that there is a com-
munity which shares the system. The knowledge systems relevant in 
cultural research belong to communities and not just individuals. In 
collaborative and participatory cultural research, and in indigenous 
activist research, the knowledge systems of extra-academic communi-
ties are introduced to academia. 
The notion of epistemic communities – or scientific communities or re-
search communities – is crucial in social epistemology. In the commu-
nitarian forms of social epistemology, the primary knower is taken to 
be a community and not an individual (e.g. Nelson 1993; see also 
Kusch 2011). I endorse this approach. The epistemic communities 
discussed in the philosophy of science typically consist of the repre-
sentatives of a discipline, a research programme or a paradigm. Here, I 
will of course also be discussing extra-academic epistemic communi-
ties. In participatory and collaborative research, as well as in indigenous 
studies, the extra-academic communities who are taken to have 
knowledge systems of their own are typically assumed to be communi-
ties who share a culture, traditions, a conceptual framework and often 
a language. 
Philosophers of science sometimes also refer to the scientific com-
munity in its entirety. However, epistemic communities can also be 
very small. For instance, in inter- or transdisciplinary research, where 
several approaches from different disciplines or even from extra-
academic sources are integrated, it is reasonable to treat the community 
of researchers and extra-academic agents taking part in the project as 
an epistemic community. This is because there is no larger community 
whose members could competently evaluate the work done within the 
project. 
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I do not use the more inclusive notion of the scientific community. 
By epistemic communities I usually mean communities comprised of 
researchers who represent the same discipline, research programme or 
approach. Sometimes I also follow the researchers I study when they 
talk about extra-academic knowledge systems, and assume that these 
systems are shared by extra-academic epistemic communities. In some 
cases, especially when discussing inter- or transdisciplinary research, I 
use the narrow notion of epistemic community described above. 
 
3.5. Interactive objectivity 
The sense in which I use the notion of objectivity is one that has been 
developed especially in social epistemology. I have found it useful in 
the study of collaboration, participation and activist research, as it al-
lows for epistemic diversity and overtly political research, and relies on 
the notion of epistemic communities. 
The worry of the critics mentioned in section 2 is that the "alterna-
tive knowledge systems" of the extra-academic communities are in 
conflict with norms and criteria accepted in academic knowledge pro-
duction. Instead of attempting to assess the allegedly alternative 
knowledge systems, I suggest a focus on the assessment of the new, 
emerging research communities. Interactive objectivity of a research com-
munity occurs when the community reaches intersubjective agreement 
on an issue as a result of an intense debate, or when a community fol-
lows inclusive procedures that allow debates to be had effectively 
(Douglas 2007; 2009; Kitcher 1993; Longino 1990; 2002; Van Bouwel 
2009; King, Morgan-Olsen and Wong 2014; Wylie 2015). 
Interactive accounts of objectivity stress the importance of both in-
tra-community and intercommunity criticism. Objective research 
communities should sustain, even encourage, diverse and competing 
viewpoints. They should also be responsive to outside criticism. When 
defending extra-academic participation and collaboration in academic 
knowledge production, Wylie appeals to this idea. By taking extra-
academic critical viewpoints into account, researchers can in some 
cases increase the objectivity of the research they conduct. 
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Helen Longino (1990; 2002) has formulated criteria with which it is 
possible to evaluate the objectivity of research communities. These 
criteria rest on the idea of effective peer criticism: "subjecting hypothe-
ses, data, reasoning and background assumptions to criticism from a 
variety of perspectives" (Longino 2002, 205) is an indispensable part of 
academic knowledge production. The criteria include: 1) the existence 
of venues for effective criticism, such as journals and conferences; 2) 
uptake of criticism: "beliefs and theories must change over time in 
response to the critical discourse taking place" (ibid., 129); 3) publicly 
recognised standards for evaluation of observations and theories; and 
4) “tempered equality of epistemic authority”: "the social position or 
economic power of an individual or group in a community ought not 
to determine who or what perspectives are taken seriously in that 
community" (ibid., 131). The equality is "tempered", because a research 
community may have good reasons for rejecting some perspectives, 
and it is right to acknowledge expertise. Nevertheless, Longino stresses 
that it is important not only to allow potentially dissenting voices, but 
also to cultivate them. 
I rely on these criteria when I examine the new kinds of research 
communities taking shape in both indigenous studies and participatory 
research. I do not concentrate on defending the criteria. Nevertheless, 
their applicability here may be seen as one argument in their favour. I 
do however comment on their suitability in the case of young or "im-
mature" disciplines and research programmes. These often go through 
a phase in which they define their agenda, during which outside criti-
cism is not taken into account as well as it should be under Longino's 
norms. A social, interactive account of objectivity should take these 
developments into consideration when discussing emerging research 
communities and young research programmes or disciplines. Longino's 
norms work best when they are applied to the evaluation of established 
academic communities. When using them to assess emerging research 
communities, it is important to pay attention to developments within 
the community, as it can become more objective over time – or fail to 
do so. 
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4. Practices towards alien knowledge systems 
In the articles I develop normative, constructive criticisms which can 
hopefully prove useful in the development of the new forms of cultural 
research that are emerging as the habitual roles of researchers and their 
research subjects change. I identify and analyse epistemic shortcomings 
related especially to relativism and objectivity. In this section I summa-
rise my main arguments on these two themes. I start with an account 
of relativistic research practices, and proceed then to delineate some 
criteria which the new research communities must meet in order to be 
objective. 
 
4.1. Relativistic research practices 
In two of the articles (III, IV) I discuss relativistic research practices. I 
am interested in one very specific type of practice. I focus on the ways 
in which cultural researchers, especially ethnographers, treat the 
knowledge systems of the people whose culture they study – or more 
precisely, how they treat the knowledge or beliefs of these people, and 
their ways of producing and justifying knowledge claims, in their publica-
tions. That is, I do not follow cultural researchers to the field in order to 
observe their encounters with informants, collaborators, co-researchers 
or colleagues. Instead, I focus on the ways in which the knowledge 
claims and knowledge systems of these people are treated in published 
research. I hold that the moderately relativistic practice of avoiding the 
appraisal of alien knowledge systems used to be justified in ethnogra-
phy, but is now becoming problematic. 
Let us distinguish four different ways in which academic researchers 
can treat extra-academic knowledge systems allegedly different from 
their own, and knowledge claims made by people who are taken to 
represent those knowledge systems. 
 
1. Disregard. The researchers do not pay attention to the 
knowledge system and knowledge claims of the extra-academic 
agents. 
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2. Ethnocentrism. The researchers acknowledge the existence of di-
verse knowledge systems, but see their own as superior to the 
systems of the extra-academic agents. 
3. Avoiding appraisal. The researchers do not disregard the 
knowledge system, but they avoid epistemic appraisal of it and 
of (at least some of the) knowledge claims of the extra-
academic agents. 
4. Critical interaction. The researchers approach the knowledge sys-
tem and knowledge claims of the extra-academic agents re-
sponsively, but critically. 
 
In the papers I focus on the last two approaches. I hold that the prac-
tice of avoiding the appraisal of alien knowledge systems is moderately 
relativistic. 
When relativism is discussed in the context of ethnography, it is 
usually assumed that there are two clearly separate epistemic communi-
ties, the researchers and the research subjects, and that their roles are 
asymmetrical: it is the task of the researcher to understand and inter-
pret the language, beliefs and culture of the people whose culture is 
being studied. If the issue at stake in the philosophical discussion is the 
apparently irrational beliefs of the research subjects, it is the researcher 
who should find out whether the apparent irrationality could be ex-
plained away. If that proves impossible, the approaches suggested vary. 
One can for instance stress the need to doubt the applicability of our 
norms of rationality when evaluating other knowledge systems (Witt-
genstein 1967; Winch 1964) – and here it is once again the researcher 
whose duty it is to entertain such a doubt. The roles of researcher and 
research subject are also the same when the question is whether we can 
understand a belief we cannot hold (MacIntyre 1970; Williams 1974); 
whether the idea of incommensurable conceptual frameworks is tena-
ble or not; or whether the possibility of translation rests on the as-
sumption that the people whose ideas are being translated are rational. 
(Quine 1960; Davidson 1974; Henderson 1987. See also Wilson 1970; 
Hollis and Lukes 1982; Simon 1998; Risjord 2007.) This is natural as 
long as there are two very distinct communities, and the members of 
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one are trying to understand the members of the other. Moreover, in 
earlier ethnography this really was the case, and even today it often still 
is.   
Different forms of relativism have influenced the development of 
ethnographic research practices. Relativistic ideas do not work in a 
vacuum, and during the last century, different forms of relativism have 
been linked to various influential clusters of ideas. Some research prac-
tices that I call relativistic also embody ideas deriving from schools of 
thought such as structuralism, hermeneutics and poststructuralism. As 
noted, the forms of relativism also vary. I concentrate on forms that 
have had an obvious impact on research practices in cultural research. 
Of the forms of relativism described in the last section, I discuss cul-
tural relativism, but concentrate mainly on conceptual relativism and 
"postmodern" epistemic relativism. 
Certain insights related to cultural relativism, and particularly to 
conceptual relativism, have pointed ethnographic research practices in 
the direction of avoiding the appraisal of knowledge systems alien to 
the researchers’ own communities. As postmodern relativism has had 
an impact on the development of ethnography, and cultural research in 
general, it has indeed challenged some earlier practices, but not that of 
avoiding appraisal. 
Cultural relativism shaped ethnographic methods and practices dur-
ing the first decades of the twentieth century. It was formulated against 
the views of nineteenth-century anthropologists like Frazer and Tylor, 
who placed different cultures on an evolutionary scale ranging from 
primitive to modern. Franz Boas and his followers considered such 
ideas of cultural evolution to be ethnocentric. They emphasised "the 
validity of every set of norms for the people whose lives are guided by 
them" (Herskovits 1948, 76) and the need for anthropologists not to 
evaluate the cultures they study according to their own cultural norms. 
(Jarvie 2007; Hollis and Lukes 1982; Herskovits 1948; Marchettoni 
2003.) 
Though cultural relativism was important in the development of 
ethnographic methods and research practices during the first decades 
of the twentieth century, conceptual relativism has had at least an 
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equally strong impact on their later development. In principle, cultural 
relativism could lead to the practice of using the standards of evalua-
tion accepted in an alternative knowledge system when evaluating 
knowledge claims made within it. Ethnographers rarely do this, how-
ever. Instead they do not evaluate such knowledge claims at all. 
As I argue in (III) and (IV), different formulations of conceptual 
relativism fell in fertile ground among ethnographers as structuralist 
ideas, hermeneutics and the "linguistic turn" highlighted difficulties 
related to understanding and translation. Ethnographers came to see 
themselves as cultural translators. The strongest forms of conceptual 
relativism are problematic in that they can lead different conceptual 
frameworks to be assessed as deeply incommensurable, which is diffi-
cult to defend (Davidson 1974). Ethnographers cannot accept the idea 
of a total lack of translatability between different frameworks. The 
problem can be solved, for instance, by resorting to the hermeneutical 
view of understanding and interpretation: the conceptual frameworks 
of the researcher and the researched may be different, but the language 
of the former can be expanded so as to express the meanings and nu-
ances of local expressions in the latter (Geertz 1973; Risjord 2007). 
Thus, comparisons between statements made in different conceptual 
frameworks are possible, but only following a slow research process 
that bridges the gap between them. The hermeneutic process is, how-
ever, often seen as never-ending. Neither do the research questions of 
ethnographers often necessitate comparisons. The initial methodologi-
cal abstinence from comparison and critical evaluation can thus be-
come the status quo.  
In other words, it became normal in ethnography to avoid appraising 
the knowledge claims the informants made, as well as their alleged 
knowledge systems. There were – and still often are – good reasons to 
do so. Propositions that might seem prima facie similar to ones we might 
utter could, in fact, if uttered within an unfamiliar conceptual frame-
work, differ considerably from our ways of thinking. It would be un-
wise to take sentences such as "My brother is a parrot" at face value 
(see Risjord 1993). If we assumed that we could at once understand 
them well enough to evaluate them, we might not only make a mistake, 
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but also prejudice our own understanding of the differences in ques-
tion. 
"Postmodern" epistemic relativism has had an impact on ethically 
motivated theoretical debates in anthropology and its neighboring 
disciplines, and it has also had an important role in the development of 
participatory research. It must be noted, however, that it is difficult to 
find philosophers who would defend any strong form of epistemic 
relativism. For instance, even though postcolonial and feminist philos-
ophy of science have influenced participatory research and different 
forms of activist research, epistemic relativism is repeatedly rejected in 
feminist and postcolonial philosophical literature. As Sandra Harding 
(1993, 61) notes, "[j]udgmental (or epistemological) relativism is anath-
ema to any scientific project". When reading various tracts, manifestos 
and programmatic statements published by indigenous activist re-
searchers or ethnographers who embrace participatory ideals, it is nev-
ertheless relatively easy to find comments that sound very much like 
epistemic relativism of the "postmodern" kind. Non-Western 
knowledge systems or indigenous epistemologies are indeed called 
equally valid as Western, scientific knowledge systems – even in cases 
where these appear to contradict each other. 
As I note in (IV), if appraisal is understood as the act of estimating 
whether a belief, an argument or a way of producing knowledge claims 
is valid or not, then postmodern relativism does not encourage re-
searchers to appraise extra-academic knowledge systems or knowledge 
claims made by the extra-academic agents they work with. It does not 
materially challenge the practice of avoiding appraisal. This is because 
the aim is not to appraise beliefs and ways of argumentation but rather 
to empower communities and look for ways in which they could use 
their local knowledge beneficially. The postmodern researcher quite 
methodically supports local knowledge systems. 
 
4.2. Objective research communities 
When the habitual roles in ethnographic research change, the ways in 
which ethnographers treat extra-academic knowledge systems also have 
to change. Moreover, if extra-academic knowledge systems are inte-
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grated with academic ones, it is necessary to assess the outcomes of 
this. The ways of producing and justifying knowledge claims or the 
social-epistemic practices followed in diverse extra-academic communi-
ties are not necessarily such that the communities could be deemed 
objective in the interactive sense. As long as the community and its 
knowledge system or knowledge practices stay entirely extra-academic, 
this is of no concern to a philosopher of science. However, the situa-
tion may change when informants turn into co-researchers or activist 
researchers. I will now first analyse the ways in which objective re-
search communities should approach extra-academic knowledge sys-
tems in collaborative, participatory and activist research. I then return 
to the question of extra-academic social-epistemic practices that could 
potentially jeopardise the interactive objectivity of the emerging, partic-
ipatory research communities. 
The roles given to cultural researchers and the people whose cul-
tures are being studied are changing. In collaborative and participatory 
research, the power imbalance between researchers and researched is 
destabilised, and extra-academic agents are given an active role in re-
search projects. Activist researchers often see themselves as represent-
ing the culture and the knowledge systems they study.  
Let us distinguish five different roles that the people who are being 
studied – or whose culture is being studied – can have in cultural re-
search.  
 
1. Research subject. The extra-academic agent has no active role in 
the research. 
2. Informant. The extra-academic agent has an active role, as the 
researcher relies on information received from the informant. 
However, the informant does not take part in the academic in-
terpretation and use of the information received. 
3. Collaborator. The extra-academic agent has an active role, and is 
consulted in the different stages of the collaborative research 
project. A collaborator may comment on any part of the work 
conducted by researchers, and the researchers take the com-
ments into account. 
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4. Co-researcher. The extra-academic agent does not have formal 
academic training, but has an active role in all stages of the 
participatory research project. Ideally there is no power asym-
metry between the researcher and the co-researcher. 
5. Activist researcher. An academically trained researcher who sees 
herself or himself as representing the viewpoints – and at 
times the knowledge system – of an extra-academic communi-
ty, e.g. an indigenous community. 
 
When the roles change, the composition of research communities also 
change. When informants become co-researchers, they join a research 
team, and when such teams become common, the change shapes larger 
research communities. When cultural activists become activist re-
searchers and form a new research programme, they form a research 
community of their own. As the communities in question are research 
communities, their interactive objectivity can and should be assessed. 
This is the case even if some or all of the members of the communities 
are taken to represent, or see themselves as representing, extra-
academic knowledge systems. 
Let us now assess which approaches to extra-academic knowledge 
systems are acceptable when the role differentiations within cultural 
research projects change. The assessment will rely on an interactive 
account of objectivity: in order to be objective, the emerging research 
communities must follow inclusive procedures that allow effective 
debates. 
 
1. Disregard. Researchers do not take notice of extra-academic 
knowledge systems. This is not a typical approach in cultural 
research, as the researchers usually wish to understand the 
knowledge system of the people they study. It is possible in ar-
chaeology if descendant communities are not taken to hold 
any knowledge relevant to the interpretation of the findings. 
However, this assumption has recently been criticised. Disre-
gard is also possible in a field such as physical anthropology, 
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where the role given to the extra-academic agents is that of 
mere research subjects. 
2. Ethnocentrism. Researchers acknowledge that extra-academic 
knowledge systems exist, but take their own knowledge system 
to be self-evidently superior. This approach has been strongly 
criticised in anthropology, and more recently also in other 
fields, for instance in development studies. It may lead to mis-
interpretation and errors, no matter what the role given to ex-
tra-academic agents. 
3. Avoiding appraisal. Researchers avoid appraising extra-academic 
knowledge systems. As noted, as long as the knowledge sys-
tems of the researchers and the researched stay apart, it is pos-
sible to avoid the appraisal of alien knowledge systems. In oth-
er words, avoiding appraisal is feasible if the role given to the 
extra-academic agent is that of a research subject, informant, or to 
some degree, collaborator. However, as I argue in more detail 
below, if the extra-academic agent becomes a co-researcher in a 
participatory project, avoiding appraisal is not an acceptable 
practice, as it hinders intra-community criticism. Moreover, in 
the case of activist research, avoiding appraisal is not an accepta-
ble practice, as it hinders inter-community criticism. 
4. Critical interaction. Researchers adopt an open but critical stance 
towards extra-academic knowledge systems. In collaborative 
research it may often be necessary to approach the arguments 
presented by extra-academic collaborators critically, even when 
the arguments are taken to derive from an extra-academic 
knowledge system. In participatory research, where extra-
academic agents have the role of co-researchers, all of their 
work must be approached in a critical manner, even if their 
knowledge claims or arguments are taken to derive from an 
extra-academic knowledge system. In the case of activist re-
search, other researchers must also approach the work of ac-
tivist researchers critically for the same reason. 
 
Changing Research Communities 
 37 
Avoiding appraisal is still often a feasible practice. However, it is prob-
lematic in participatory research. If extra-academic agents become part 
of a research community – as they should, according to the participa-
tory ideals – they then become part of a community whose interactive 
objectivity can be assessed, for instance by using Longino's criteria. If 
the contributions of all people belonging to a research community are 
not met with the same critical attitude, the objectivity of the entire 
community will suffer. Similarly, if fellow researchers do not approach 
the contributions of activist researchers in a critical manner, the activist 
researchers will miss valuable criticisms, and the interactive objectivity 
of the larger research community will suffer. 
As an approach to activist research, avoiding appraisal is totally un-
acceptable. It is unacceptable even if – or perhaps precisely when – 
activist researchers themselves expect it. As I will show, there are cases 
where activist researchers have willingly adopted the role of critics, but 
where they have not been very receptive to outside criticism. As Rico 
Hauswald (forthcoming) notes, a typical activist research community is 
not very diverse epistemically. Instead, it is biased towards such theo-
retical and methodological approaches as are suited to the political 
goals the activists share. Intra-community criticism may thus be defi-
cient. If activist research is to be objective, outside criticism must be 
offered to the research communities, and they must take it into ac-
count: their "beliefs and theories must change over time in response to 
the critical discourse taking place" (Longino 2002, 129). 
In participatory research, the problems caused by the practice of 
avoiding appraisal may however be evaded for some time. As long as 
the difference between the scientific or academic researchers and a 
socially marginal, extra-academic community is stark enough on multi-
ple levels, avoiding appraisal may not cause actual trouble. The re-
searchers’ position makes it possible for them to direct the project and 
choose such pieces of local knowledge, and such features of the local 
knowledge systems, that the objectivity of the research community is 
not jeopardised. However, the better the project achieves its goals, the 
more problematic the practice of avoiding direct appraisal becomes. 
Efficacious participation is supposed to reduce the power differentials 
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between the academic and extra-academic participants, and to result in 
a single, merged epistemic community. Moreover, as Uskali Mäki and I 
note (V), the power imbalances in different participatory projects are 
not always alike. It is fully possible that some of the extra-academic 
agents taking part in a participatory project are in a social or financial 
position of power in relation to the academic researchers. Hence, 
avoiding appraisal is eventually untenable in a successful participatory 
project. 
This of course highlights the difficulty of translation, to which the 
practice of avoiding appraisal was originally offered as a practical solu-
tion. As King, Morgan­Olsen and Wong (2014) note, difficulties in 
translation can be used as excuses that lead to epistemic injustice. They 
identify worldview agonism as dissent that "arises insofar as meaningful 
argument about particular scientific hypotheses or political proposals 
cannot even get off the ground: the parties do not accept compatible 
rules of inference and evidence". In other words, in worldview ago-
nism the knowledge systems of the different communities are incom-
patible, even incommensurable. King, Morgan­Olsen and Wong worry 
about friction between academic and indigenous viewpoints being 
systematically misidentified as worldview agonism even where such a 
diagnosis is too hasty. They argue that in collaborations with indige-
nous communities, some shared standards of evaluation may be 
reached, even if the differences between the conceptual frameworks 
and knowledge systems of the different communities would seem con-
siderable at first. A successful translation may prove the knowledge 
systems to be compatible enough for collaboration, perhaps even par-
ticipation. 
However, difficulties in translation do not only occur between re-
searchers and extra-academic communities, but also in interdisciplinary 
research. There too, researchers have to endeavour to understand the 
knowledge systems of their colleagues who represent other disciplines. 
Diverse power imbalances are usually much more pronounced in par-
ticipatory research and activist research than in interdisciplinary re-
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search,2 but the only epistemically acceptable practice towards alien 
knowledge systems in these research approaches is critical interaction.  
The importance of critical interaction stands out when we take into 
account the fact that extra-academic epistemic communities may 
breach Longino's norms in multiple ways. This may cause problems in 
participatory research. When discussing worldview agonism, King, 
Morgan­Olsen and Wong (2014) take into consideration the third 
norm – the requirement for shared, publicly recognised standards of 
evaluation (Longino 2002). Extra-academic epistemic communities 
may however have social practices related to knowledge and 
knowledge production that go against the core ideas of interactive 
objectivity in other ways. For instance, knowledge may be held to be 
something that only some members of the community are allowed to 
access; or it may be important to pass certain pieces of knowledge 
unchanged from generation to generation; or special epistemic authori-
ty may be given to people with a specific social status. Such practices 
conflict with Longino's first, second and fourth norm. Venues for ef-
fective criticism cannot exist if strict secrecy is required; beliefs cannot 
change in response to critical discourse if they must be unchangeable; 
and any link between social position and epistemic authority is incon-
sistent with the norm of tempered equality of epistemic authority. 
Participatory research aims to form research communities with 
both academic and extra-academic members. In order to be objective, 
these communities cannot tolerate social practices that go against 
Longino's norms. However, to recognise such practices and to be able 
to effectively resist them, the members of the new, emerging research 
community need to approach the social-epistemic practices of all of its 
members in an equally critical manner. 
 
5. Disciplines and research programmes 
In the articles I examine some of the ways in which cultural research 
can be influenced by the changes in the relationship between research-
ers and the people whose cultures they study. In order to keep the 
                                                      
2 On power imbalances in interdisciplinary research, see Mäki 2013.  
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analysis strongly linked to actual changes taking place, I use examples 
from authentic research projects, and discuss local developments with-
in larger research programmes. The examples are derived from various 
disciplines and programmes, the main attention being paid to folkloris-
tics, especially Finnish folkloristics (I, II, III, IV); indigenous studies, 
especially Sámi indigenous studies (I, IV); and transdisciplinary re-
search (V). Some illustrations are also taken from archaeology and 
anthropology. As some of these disciplines and programmes may not 
be familiar to the reader, I shall next give a short description of them 
and of the ways in which I approach them in the articles. 
 
5.1. Researchers building nations: folkloristics and  
indigenous studies  
My focus on folkloristics and indigenous studies, and especially the 
contrast between the two, is partly motivated by my belief that post-
nationalist thought has as yet been somewhat neglected in the theoreti-
cal discussions related to the changes taking place in contemporary 
cultural research. Both indigenous studies and collaborative and partic-
ipatory research in anthropology and the neighbouring disciplines have 
been inspired by postcolonial thought. Partly due to the protestations 
of cultural activists, and the influence of such critics as Edward Said 
(1978) and Vine Deloria, Jr. (1969), anthropologists have recognised 
ways in which they and their predecessors have served colonial rule. 
Similar developments have occurred both in former colonies and in 
settler states where the indigenous populations have long been minori-
ties. Earlier cultural research is now viewed as oppressive. This has 
moved ethnographers – and for instance archaeologists – to seek more 
ethical research methods and practices, and indigenous scholars to 
developed new forms of research, often overtly political, where re-
searchers typically belong to the group they study and seek to advance 
its interests. However, as many of these new forms of research are 
politically motivated, and as the explicit aims of indigenous studies 
include nation-building (see, e.g., Seurujärvi-Kari 2010; Stordahl 2008; 
Gaski 2008), theoretical work on nationalism and earlier research that 
has participated in nation-building ought to be taken into account here. 
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Critiques drawing from the critique of nationalism presented in the 
1980s (Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983; Anderson 1983) have been 
voiced within indigenous studies (e.g. Valkonen 2010). However, the 
theoretical debates on collaborative and participatory research, as well 
as on indigenous studies, are especially lively in settler states like Cana-
da and the United States, and in countries that used to be either colo-
nised or colonising powers: in other words, countries where colonial-
ism is a more prominent issue than nationalism. There are usually no 
references to post-nationalist self-critique presented in disciplines that 
have participated in nationalist movements as disciplines. Thus a com-
parison to folkloristics, a discipline that used to be strongly involved in 
nation-building around 100 to 150 years ago, seemed appropriate here. 
 
Folkloristics is one of the disciplines that contributed in the building of 
the Finnish nation in the nineteenth and early twentieth century. Along 
with other disciplines building nations at this time, early folklorists 
relied on essentialist ideas. According to their own understanding, pat-
riotic researchers were uncovering the true nature of the nation. Influ-
enced by the Romantic and Hegelian ideas of the time, they believed 
that a People could not develop into a fully-fledged Nation if it did not 
have a proper history. Finland had no written history as an independ-
ent or autonomous nation, but as the nineteenth-century nation-
builders realised, the Finnish oral tradition of epic poetry was impres-
sive. This made folkloristics an important discipline in the building of 
the Finnish nation, as it was able to find the required history in oral 
poetry. (Anttonen 2012; Masonen 2003; Wilson 1976.) 
During the latter half of the twentieth century, the discipline went 
through a post-nationalist self-critique comparable to the postcolonial 
self-critique in anthropology. This was heightened by the construction-
ist critique of nationalism presented in the 1980s (Hobsbawm and 
Ranger 1983; Anderson 1983). The essentialist notions of the early 
folklorists and other nation-builders were dismissed, their political 
projections were criticised, and their work seen not as an unveiling but 
as a building of nations. (Wilson 1976; Abrahams 1993; Anttonen 
2005; Baycoft and Hopkin 2012.) 
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Contemporary folkloristics is a discipline devoted to the study of all 
forms of folklore, both historical and contemporary, and of their use 
and functions in society. Different methods are used depending on the 
project in question – archival work and ethnographic fieldwork are 
both common. Finnish folklorists often concentrate on domestic folk-
lore, but important work is also conducted abroad, especially among 
other Finno-Ugric peoples. In Finland the discipline has a long tradi-
tion of research on the small Finno-Ugric ethnic groups in Russia. 
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, folklorists have studied the 
development of rising cultural consciousness, neotraditionalism or 
ethnonationalism in the Finno-Ugric region. Political change made 
cultural revival possible, and local intellectuals have been active in the 
promotion of local traditions and the rebuilding of ethnic identities. 
These processes bear a resemblance to the building of the Finnish 
nation approximately 100 years earlier, a fact that has not escaped the 
attention of the activists themselves. (Anttonen et al. 2000; Siikala, 
Klein and Mathisen 2004; Siikala 2005.)  
Folklorists study cultural movements that have given rise to new 
forms of activist research, and in some cases they have also collaborat-
ed with activist researchers. More critical interaction could nevertheless 
occur between folklorists and activist researchers. In one of the papers 
(II), I illustrate how contemporary cultural movements have affected 
important theoretical ideas and concepts in cultural research, including 
folkloristics. My aim is to point out why and how folklorists could – 
and perhaps should – use the post-nationalist critique developed in the 
discipline's own theoretical discussions in the more general debate on 
the links between cultural activism and cultural research. 
 
Indigenous studies is an integral part of the international political move-
ment of indigenous peoples, which includes groups geographically as 
distant from each other as the Māori, the First Nations and the Sámi. 
The notion of indigenous peoples has gained significant political weight 
during the last few decades, largely because of active co-operation by 
different activist groups who represent different indigenous peoples 
around the world. The co-operation and the uniting concept are not 
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matters of course, since the activists most often wish to stress the orig-
inal aspects of their people’s culture, and the distinction between indig-
enous peoples and other minority groups is controversial and highly 
politicised. However, indigenous peoples were lumped together in 
earlier research by using such terms as primitive peoples or tribal peoples, 
and the forms of oppression they have faced have also been similar 
around the world. One shared experience that has had a tremendous 
impact on the development of indigenous studies is that of forced 
assimilation through schooling. Groups geographically as far from each 
other as the Māori, the Sámi and people belonging to the First Nations 
have all been forced to send their children to schools where their na-
tive tongue has been forbidden, and where the openly admitted aim 
has been to make the children forget their parents' culture. When the 
self-emancipatory movements stressing the importance of cultural 
identity have gained strength, one of their most important agendas has 
been to take control of the ways in which indigenous children and 
young people are educated. The aim is "the establishment of systems 
of education which reflect, respect and embrace indigenous cultural 
values, philosophies and ideologies which have shaped, nurtured and 
sustained our people for tens of thousands of years" (Seurujärvi-Kari 
1996, 171–172). 
This also includes higher education and research, and several col-
leges and research institutes, such as the First Nations University of 
Canada and Sámi Allaskuvla (Sámi University College) in northern 
Norway, specialise in indigenous studies today. These institutes are not 
insignificant in size: for example, Sámi Allaskuvla has a staff of nearly 
one hundred. The aims of the multidisciplinary research programme 
are overtly political. Its proclaimed aims are indigenous self-
determination, identity building, mental decolonisation, knowledge 
building – and even nation building.3 The main audience of the re-
search is the researcher's own people, so a Sámi researcher's work, for 
example, should be directed by Sámi interests and preferably published 
                                                      
3 It must be noted that nation-building is here often understood as a process 
of social construction: the conscious building of an "imagined community" 
(Anderson 1983; Gaski 2008; Stordahl 2008). 
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in the Sámi language. As part of the mental decolonisation and indige-
nous knowledge building, researchers strive to use "indigenous 
knowledge", "indigenous knowledge systems" or "indigenous episte-
mologies", and to develop "indigenous paradigms" (Seurujärvi-Kari 
1996; Porsanger 2004, 2010; Stordahl 2008; Smith 1999). 
Indigenous studies belongs to the large number of new disciplines 
and programmes that were born in the final few decades of the twenti-
eth century. These disciplines and programmes share the idea that 
research is always intimately connected to power, is therefore inevitably 
political, and should thus be political openly. In terms of theory, indig-
enous studies is currently still heterogeneous, and the theoretical dis-
cussion revolves mostly around the critique of earlier research viewed 
as oppressive. The methods used by indigenous scholars often resem-
ble participatory research methods, and many research projects are 
very down-to-earth development projects that aspire to engage with 
the community (e.g. Porsanger and Østmo 2011). Nevertheless, much 
more controversial ideas have been promoted in theoretical discussions 
and academic tracts, such as developing shamanistic research methods 
(Kuokkanen 2000).  
 
5.2. Collaborative and participatory methods in anthropology,  
archaeology and transdisciplinary research 
As noted, especially in former colonial and settler states, people be-
longing to communities studied in anthropology and related disciplines 
have become critical of their own role in research, as well as that of the 
researchers. Anthropologists have reacted to this criticism in diverse 
ways. The development of different kinds of socially engaged, collabo-
rative and participatory forms of research in current anthropology is a 
peaceful and often successful attempt to respond to it. However, 
sometimes things do not go that smoothly. A striking example of this 
are the disputes between Native Americans and archaeologists in the 
United States during the past few decades.  
Many Native Americans have felt that their graves, sacred places 
and oral traditions have been treated as public heritage, and that ar-
chaeologists have assumed the right to treat these according to their 
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own wishes and needs. As a result, non-Native American human re-
mains would be reburied if found, whereas Native American human 
remains have been taken to belong in laboratories and museum collec-
tions. These feelings have led to a strong political movement, which in 
1990 resulted in changes to legislation. Thus, according to the Native 
American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act (NAGPRA), 
"American human remains and funerary objects shall be expeditiously 
returned where the requesting Indian tribe or Native Hawaiian organi-
zation can show cultural affiliation by a preponderance of the evidence 
based upon geographical, kinship, biological, archaeological, anthropo-
logical, linguistic, folkloric, oral traditional, historical, or other relevant 
information or expert opinion". The changes in both the legislation 
and the discipline's ethical codes nowadays make it indispensable for 
archaeologists to collaborate with the tribes. Some archaeologists are 
happy to do so, but some see the new regulations as a threat to the 
objectivity of archaeological research, and the issue has evoked tense 
theoretical debates. (Zimmerman 2008; Biolsi and Zimmerman 1997; 
Ferguson, Anyon and Ladd 1996.) 
 
Collaborative and participatory methods are not used only in cultural 
research. They are also strongly promoted in transdisciplinary research, 
which is the subject of my joint article (V) with Mäki. We focus on 
extra-academic forms of transdisciplinarity, where not only academic 
disciplines are transcended, but where extra-academic knowledge is 
integrated with scientific and academic knowledge. 
Transdisciplinarity has become especially popular in development 
studies, where the knowledge produced by researchers is intended to 
benefit local communities. The aim is to solve problems and meet 
challenges too complex for any one academic discipline to tackle, and 
the result of a transdisciplinary project should ideally be an applicable 
solution to the problem at hand. Many projects focus on local prob-
lems, but transdisciplinarity is also promoted as a way to approach 
global challenges, such as biodiversity loss, climate change and global 
poverty. The research problems are not necessarily recognised within 
academic disciplines, but only by extra-academic stakeholders, such as 
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public authorities, businesses, NGOs or local communities. These 
groups are often also included in the research process in some way. 
Transdisciplinarity has been strongly influenced by contemporary ideas 
about the proper relationship between academic researchers and the 
public, and by a normative urge to develop more socially inclusive 
research practices. When a research project aims to produce policy-
relevant knowledge and to offer solutions to pressing real-life prob-
lems, it is now often thought that the people whose lives the problem 
touches should participate actively in the research process to ensure 
that their viewpoints and interests are taken into account. Due to such 
ideas, collaborative and participatory approaches are common in trans-
disciplinarity. (Brown et al. 2010; Hirsch Hadorn et al. 2008; Hirsch 
Hadorn, Pohl and Bammer 2010; Leavy 2011; Russell, Wickson and 
Carey 2008; Mobjörk 2010.) As we note, especially when the extra-
academic participants in a transdisciplinary project represent a non-
Western local community, theoretical ideas and conceptual tools are 
borrowed from anthropology and postcolonial literature. Importantly, 
the practice of avoiding the appraisal of alien knowledge systems ap-
pears to be sometimes adopted in transdisciplinary projects and partic-
ipatory development projects. Thus the specific challenges related to 
the development of collaboration and participation in cultural research 
may also impact transdisciplinary research, as well as some other disci-
plines and research programmes. 
 
6. Observed shortcomings in interactive objectivity 
In the articles I examine the objectivity of emerging research commu-
nities in both activist research and participatory research. Collaborative 
and participatory approaches are adopted in many discplines, as well as 
in transdisciplinary research; new disciplines and research programmes, 
such as indigenous studies, are also emerging. The research being con-
ducted is bound to have difficulties and shortcomings, as research 
practices have not yet become established. I pay special attention to the 
social-epistemic practices of the new, emerging research communities. 
In this section I briefly describe some shortcomings that threaten to 
undermine the interactive objectivity of such communities. I distin-
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guish between shortcomings in inter-community criticism and short-
comings in intra-community criticism, and point out possible connec-
tions between the practice of avoiding the appraisal of alien knowledge 
systems and the shortcomings observed in interactive objectivity. 
 
6.1. Shortcomings in inter-community criticism 
Indigenous studies is often represented as an outside criticism of West-
ern science. Especially in programmatic texts, the aim of indigenous 
studies is described as twofold: first comes the mental decolonisation 
and self-determination of indigenous peoples, and then, partly in order 
to succeed in the first task, the critique of Western, allegedly ethnocen-
tric research traditions (Smith 1999; Porsanger 2010). 
I believe that the critical role which many indigenous scholars have 
adopted is epistemically useful for other disciplines that fall under the 
umbrella of cultural research. However, indigenous scholars have at 
times been reluctant to take outside criticism into account. In other 
words, the critical role they have adopted has not always been as recip-
rocal as would be desirable. Such a role resembles the one Wylie would 
give to extra-academic agents: they provide researchers with diverse, 
critical viewpoints. When arguing that collaboration with descendant 
communities may be epistemically beneficial in archaeology, Wylie 
invokes the fourth criterion formulated by Longino, the so-called tem-
pered equality of epistemic authority: "the social position or economic 
power of an individual or group in a community ought not to deter-
mine who or what perspectives are taken seriously in that community" 
(Longino 2002, 131). Wylie suggests that the norm should be explicitly 
extended outside academia: 
In order to counteract the risks of insularity and the effects of dysfunc-
tional group dynamics that can insulate foundational assumptions and 
norms of justification from critical scrutiny, well functioning [academic] 
epistemic communities should actively cultivate collaborations with exter-
nal communities whose epistemic goals, practices, and beliefs differ from 
their own in ways that have the potential to mobilise transformative criti-
cism. (Wylie 2015, 207.) 
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The role Wylie suggests for descendant communities coheres with the 
one assumed by indigenous scholars at times. However, the descendant 
communities Wylie discusses are outside academia, unlike the research 
community consisting of indigenous scholars. In order to be objective, 
indigenous scholars cannot adopt only the role of critics; the research 
community must also listen to criticism and respond to it. The young 
research programme of indigenous studies has shown some signs of 
resorting to the exclusion of certain groups from the emerging research 
community, as well as to disregard towards dissenting outside perspec-
tives. I however argue (I) that the exclusive practices are currently de-
creasing, and that outside criticism is now being taken into account 
better than earlier. The interactive objectivity of indigenous studies, or 
at least the community of indigenous Sámi scholars I study, is thus 
increasing. 
There is however another shortcoming in inter-community criticism 
in indigenous studies. The extensive post-nationalist self-critique pre-
sented by disciplines that used to take part in nation-building in Eu-
rope around a century ago – like folkloristics – has not been applied in 
the critique of indigenous studies as strongly as it could be.4 The theo-
retical debates surrounding different forms of indigenous activist re-
search are based mainly on postcolonial thought and reactions against 
it. Nation-building is one of the openly expressed goals of indigenous 
studies. The thorough post-nationalist self-critique presented in folk-
loristics (e.g. Wilson 1976; Anttonen 2005; Baycroft and Hopkin 2012) 
could also prove relevant in the case of indigenous studies. Adding it to 
the critical discussion would potentially increase the objectivity of in-
digenous activist research. However, the folkloristics literature on the 
contemporary cultural and political movements of ethnic minorities 
(e.g. Anttonen et al. 2000; Siikala et al. 2004) has rarely commented on 
activist research or indigenous studies. On the other hand, the social 
anthropologists and archaeologists who have criticised different forms 
                                                      
4 The situation resembles the one Longino describes in her latest book (2013): 
approaches and disciplines that study closely linked phenomena do not engage 
in debates with each other, even though such debates would be beneficial for 
all. 
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of indigenous activist research (e.g. Kuper 2003; 2006; McGhee 2008), 
are typically not well acquainted with the post-nationalist literature, and 
thus rarely refer to it. Constructionist arguments similar to the ones 
used in the folkloristic post-nationalist literature have been made, and 
as I argue, indigenous scholars have even taken them into account, but 
a post-national, critical perspective would nevertheless enrich the criti-
cal discussion. 
This second shortcoming in inter-community criticism is likely to 
have several reasons. I have no direct evidence to show that the prac-
tice of avoiding appraisal is one of those reasons. It is nevertheless a 
possible reason. If the indigenous activist researchers are taken to rep-
resent indigenous knowledge systems – as they often declare they do – 
then folklorists who are used to avoiding the appraisal of alien 
knowledge systems might be reluctant to engage in theoretical debate 
on indigenous activist research. 
 
6.2. Shortcomings in intra-community criticism 
In participatory research, observable shortcomings in interactive objec-
tivity are often related to intra-community criticism. The ways of pro-
ducing and justifying knowledge claims followed in extra-academic 
communities are not necessarily in accordance with Longino's norms. 
For instance, it is not unheard of in indigenous communities that epis-
temic authority depends on the speaker's age or status as an elder. This 
is of course inconsistent with Longino's (2002) fourth criterion: the 
epistemic authority of the elders is determined by their social position. 
As noted, as long as the community and its knowledge system or 
knowledge practices stay entirely extra-academic, this is of no concern 
to a philosopher of science. However, in participatory research the 
situation changes. 
Researchers who adopt a participatory approach typically aim to 
dismantle power inequalities between the researchers and the extra-
academic participants. As noted, sometimes this aim may lead re-
searchers systematically to support extra-academic knowledge systems. 
They wish to increase the appreciation of local knowledge and to pro-
mote the knowledge systems of socially marginal communities. 
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Both in activist research and participatory research, there is typically 
a mismatch between visionary, programmatic texts and actual research 
practices. In the former the "equal validity" of diverse knowledge sys-
tems may be endorsed. However, one does not encounter academic 
researchers invoking their age to back up their arguments, even if 
epistemic authority is defined according to the speaker’s age in the 
community the researcher works with. Shamanistic research methods 
are not really used either. Nevertheless, in participatory research it is 
possible to encounter situations where the extra-academic participants 
embrace practices such as defining epistemic authority according to the 
speaker’s age or status as an elder – and this is not seen as a problem in 
the research community. In other words, some members of the 
research community are not criticised for social-epistemic practices 
that would be reprehensible in the case of other members. If this ine-
quality is accepted in a participatory research project, and not criticised 
by the larger research community, the interactive objectivity of the 
whole research community suffers. 
Here too, the practice of avoiding appraisal may be one of the rea-
sons for such shortcomings. Instead of critical interaction, academic 
researchers in participatory projects may only choose to support (at 
least some features of) the knowledge system of the community they 
work with, without evaluating it critically – and thus to continue the 
practice of avoiding appraisal. This may lead them to treat some mem-
bers of their emerging research team less critically than others. The 
same reason may induce the larger research community to accept the 
practice. 
 
7. On methods 
I believe that the work of a philosopher of science should be, at least 
to some degree, empirically motivated and informed. This does not 
mean that it could not be normative and evaluative; it should just focus 
on such errors and confusions as can be observed or are probable in 
scientific or academic research. Philosophers cannot spot them without 
acquainting themselves with the disciplines they focus on. As Miriam 
Solomon and Alan Richardson note, "'intuition' has a poor track record 
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in philosophy of science" (2005, 213, see also Hacking 2015; Kuoriko-
ski 2010). It is not against mere intuition that philosophical claims 
should be tested. 
To be relevant for the disciplines and research programmes I target 
in my philosophical, normative work, I have to be well acquainted with 
questions that arise in these disciplines and programmes. Theories, 
research subjects, environments, questions and research communities 
in cultural research have changed over time. The questions which phi-
losophers of science can help with have also changed. The issues I 
discuss in this dissertation have not yet been systematically studied in 
the philosophy of anthropology or in the philosophy of the humanities. 
For this reason, I cannot merely take part in an ongoing philosophical 
discussion already ascertained as of being of interest to the disciplines 
it touches. 
In order to be sure that the issues I tackle in this dissertation are 
currently relevant, and in order to define my arguments, I have read 
research conducted in the fields I discuss; attended symposia and con-
ferences in anthropology and folkloristics; visited research institutes 
specialising in indigenous studies; interviewed researchers; and con-
ducted case studies on a small scale. Nevertheless, this empirical work 
serves only as a means to ensure that my understanding of the phe-
nomena I comment on – the changes in the respective roles of re-
searcher and researched in contemporary cultural research – is ade-
quate. Only if it is adequate, my philosophical work has the chance to 
prove useful in the future development of the new research practices I 
study. 
I wrote one of the papers (II) for an audience of folklorists and not 
philosophers. The methods I use in this paper need to be discussed in 
more detail, as they resulted in a finding that surprised me, and conse-
quently led me to explore certain themes outside the main scope of this 
dissertation.   
My aim was to draw attention to the ways in which contemporary 
cultural movements, and the activist research grown out of these 
movements, have shaped theoretical concepts used in folkloristics and 
other cultural research. In the paper I focus on the concept – or rather 
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concepts – of culture. I hope to illustrate why it would be important 
for folklorists to participate more actively in the theoretical debates 
related to overtly political, activist research. As I show, these debates 
are reflected in the concepts folklorists use. Thus it would be in the 
interest of the discipline itself to participate in discussions of them. 
Moreover, the critical, post-nationalist theoretical work done in folklor-
istics during the last decades has put folklorists in a potentially valuable 
position with regard to the questions at stake in the discussions con-
cerning activist research. The critical contribution of folklorists could 
be beneficial to the development of contemporary indigenous activist 
research. 
To ensure the relevance of my arguments from the viewpoint of 
folklorists, I decided to gather some data. I gathered 83 journal articles 
and eight doctoral dissertations published during the first decade of 
this century. Using a concordance programme (software developed for 
text analysis and concordancing) I then searched all instances where 
the words "culture" and "cultural", as well as their Finnish counter-
parts, were used in these texts. To my surprise, I found not only the 
heavily politicised concept I was looking for, but also another concept 
of culture, quite distinct from the other one. I ended up analysing both. 
When examining the concept I did not expect to find, I discuss kinds 
as homeostatic property clusters – a topic quite unrelated to the rest of 
the work at hand. I nevertheless found this discussion to be necessary: 
to fail to have offered an analysis of the second concept which was 
clearly visible in the data would have been seen with justification as a 
serious shortcoming in the paper. Overall, this experience with capri-
cious data was an instructive one. 
 
8. Overview of the articles 
The second part of this dissertation consists of five articles. They are 
not in the order in which they have been published or accepted for 
publication. Instead, I start with papers analysing examples from indig-
enous studies and folkloristics. I then move to the papers that touch on 
issues related to participatory approaches in ethnography and transdis-
ciplinary research. The first paper introduces a comparison between 
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contemporary indigenous studies and early folkloristics, and asks under 
what conditions overtly political research can be deemed objective. The 
second paper has been published in a folklore journal. In it I analyse 
two concepts of culture used in contemporary folkloristics and argue 
that it would be worthwhile for folklorists to participate more actively 
in the debate on the relationship between activism and research. The 
third and fourth papers discuss relativistic research practices. In the 
first of these two papers I argue that the practice of avoiding the ap-
praisal of alien knowledge systems is reasonable in conventional eth-
nography. In the second I lay out the reasons why the practice is never-
theless not viable in participatory research. The last of the papers is 
written jointly with Uskali Mäki. It moves from analysis of cultural 
research to the analysis of transdisciplinary research. We compare liter-
ature on extra-academic transdisciplinarity with philosophical, pluralist 
discussions on extra-academic participation and integration, and indi-
cate in the first body of literature certain problems that the second 
body should take into account. 
 
8.1. Researchers Building Nations: Under what conditions 
can overtly political research be objective? 
Researchers Building Nations introduces the philosophical discussion on 
objectivity in which I take part, as well as two of the disciplines I exam-
ine. The paper uses Sámi indigenous studies as an example of overtly 
political, heavily value-laden research, and claims that such research can 
be objective in principle. 
The idea that in order to be objective, research should be value-
free, has recently been questioned in philosophy of science. Among 
others, Heather Douglas (2007; 2009; see also Longino 1990; 2002) 
and Philip Kitcher (2011) argue that researchers need to make some 
decisions at all stages of research that necessarily include value judge-
ments, and Douglas notes that several senses of objectivity do not 
require the value-free ideal. I use two of these senses of objectivity, 
detached objectivity and interactive objectivity, to assess the objectivity of Sámi 
indigenous studies, and conclude that the young discipline is becoming 
more objective than it used to be during its first decades. 
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Nation-building is one of the proclaimed aims of Sámi indigenous 
studies. Therefore I compare the discipline to nineteenth-century Finn-
ish folkloristics by drawing parallels with the nation-building ideologies 
in the latter. The comparison is used in the responses I provide to 
standard criticisms of indigenous activist research. In short, researchers 
who wish to use indigenous knowledge in their work have been ac-
cused of relativism (Boghossian 2006) and of reviving an old, essential-
ising image of the "Native" (Kuper 2003; McGhee 2008). I maintain 
that these critiques are not based only on the "value-free" meaning of 
objectivity, but what Douglas calls detached objectivity: "the prohibition 
against using values in place of evidence" (Douglas 2007, 133). 
I am optimistic about the reaction of Sámi indigenous studies to the 
criticism presented, and believe that in time it will not be adhering to 
the kind of relativism and essentialism the critics worry about. My op-
timism depends on the preparedness of the research community to 
allow dissenting voices and to respond to criticism – that is, on the 
discipline's increasing interactive objectivity. Sámi indigenous studies 
has been prone to adopt a one-sided position with regard to criticism. 
The discipline has often been represented as criticism of Western sci-
ence from the outside; in other words, indigenous scholars have as-
sumed a role that resembles the role Wylie (2014, 2015) suggests for 
descendant communities in archaeology. However, unlike the commu-
nities Wylie discusses, the research community of Sámi indigenous 
studies is inside academia, and in order to be objective, it cannot adopt 
only the role of critics. In accordance with the norms formulated by 
Longino (2002), it must also listen to criticism and respond to it. My 
optimistic assessment in the paper is based on the observation that the 
interactive objectivity of the Sámi IS research community is increasing, 
and that outside criticism is being taken into account. As a result, the 
detached objectivity of the research conducted has also increased. 
The two senses of objectivity used in this paper prove applicable in 
the assessment of Sámi indigenous studies. The capacity to detect ad-
vancement, and to note the increasing objectivity of the research 
community, is particularly important. The process the discipline is 
undergoing is not atypical of overtly political research programmes. In 
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fact, young disciplines often go through a phase in which they define 
their agenda, and during which outside criticism is not taken into ac-
count as well as it should be according to Longino's norms. When 
discussing emerging research communities and young research pro-
grammes or disciplines, a social, interactive account of objectivity 
should take these kinds of developments into consideration. 
 
8.2 At Least Two Concepts of Culture 
This paper examines two concepts of culture used in contemporary 
folkloristics. One of them appears mainly in the context of archival 
work, while the other occurs chiefly in discussions of themes such as 
identity politics and ethnic minorities. The main difference between the 
two concepts is that one is used when formulating substantial theories 
related to kinds, while the other is a bone of contention in ongoing 
debates on the level of grand theories (see Merton 1968). Theoretical 
tools developed in earlier cultural research are taken in use by contem-
porary cultural movements, and this affects theoretical debates on the 
level of grand theories in folkloristics and in cultural research more 
generally. 
I call the first concept of culture the kind-constructing concept. I 
analyse it as a way of naming independent phenomena that researchers 
find when studying their data: historically and locally limited, complex 
social mechanisms that construct and support kinds – such as the 
manuscript culture in Finland in the early twentieth century. The kinds 
in question can be understood as homeostatic property clusters (Boyd 
1991; 1999). That is, several otherwise non-related properties cluster 
fairly reliably because of the culture that holds the cluster together, and 
inductive inferences can be made about the kind. 
The second concept of culture I call the bone-of-contention con-
cept. I analyse this by using the idea of contested concepts (Koselleck 
1985; 1996). A given concept is necessary because the related theoreti-
cal debates cannot be conducted without using it, but at the same time 
it is unavoidably ambiguous and contested. The opposing sides in the 
debates express their differences through different ways of using the 
relevant words. In addition, the disagreements about culture may be 
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divided in two categories: the competing grand theories about culture. 
and critical discussion about the acceptability of the very concept as 
part of a conceptual framework suitable for researchers. These debates 
are manifested in the ways in which Finnish folklorists use the bone-
of-contention concept of culture, but they rarely make this explicit. 
The current debates and tensions on the level of grand theories re-
garding the concept of culture are related to an important change in 
the subject of much cultural research. People whose cultures anthro-
pologists, folklorists and ethnologists used to study, are now reviving 
their own cultures and cultural identities, and even conducting research 
on these. These contemporary cultural movements resemble the 
movements that led to the emergence of several European nation 
states 100 to 150 years ago. In those days, folkloristics as a discipline 
took part in nation-building, and in Finland it had a particularly im-
portant role. In other words, contemporary folklorists study cultural 
movements that resemble processes in which the discipline took an 
active part a century ago. 
Especially in countries like Finland, folkloristics is in an interesting 
position regarding the above mentioned change. The discipline has 
gone through a post-nationalist self-critique comparable to the post-
colonialist self-critique in anthropology (see e.g. Anttonen 2005; 2012; 
Wilson 1976). The politically motivated research that is part of the 
contemporary cultural movements can at times resort to problematic 
theoretical claims and research practices, such as the reification of cul-
ture. Some of the critique presented against earlier nationalist folkloris-
tics is relevant in the context of contemporary cultural research too, 
when the latter takes an overtly political form. Contemporary cultural 
and political movements are studied by folklorists, but as yet the post-
nationalist critique developed in the discipline has not been fully ap-
plied to the activist research grown out of these movements. It could 
prove useful if folklorists took part more actively in the debates on 
contemporary activist research. For instance, perspectives on the bone-
of-contention concept of culture could be discussed more openly. 
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8.3. Seemingly Similar Beliefs: A case study on 
relativistic research practices 
Seemingly Similar Beliefs is the oldest of the five articles. It introduces the 
theme of relativistic research practices, and argues that the kind of 
epistemic relativism often refuted by its critics is rarely if ever observa-
ble in actual ethnographic research practices. Instead, what can be 
recognised in many cases is methodological conceptual relativism. This 
has significant practical implications, as epistemic relativism, if rigor-
ously followed, could lead ethnographers to conflate ways of argumen-
tation accepted by their informants with ways of argumentation ac-
cepted in academia. The forms of relativism actually practiced do not 
have the same consequences. 
Argumentatively the paper is structured around two examples men-
tioned by Boghossian (2006) as representing an allegedly alarming, 
"postmodern" form of epistemic relativism: the archaeologists Roger 
Anyon and Larry Zimmerman, who both collaborate with native 
American tribes and accept their traditional viewpoints on prehistory 
as valuable. My aim is to show that Boghossian is too hasty in his 
choice of examples, and that Anyon and Zimmerman are much more 
reasonably understood as methodological conceptual relativists than as 
epistemic relativists. 
To illustrate the practical difference between methodological con-
ceptual relativism and the kind of epistemic relativism Boghossian 
worries about, I present as a point of reference a case study from Finn-
ish folkloristics: Anna-Leena Siikala's work in Udmurtia. Among Si-
ikala's informants there are cultural activists whose views on their own 
cultures resemble certain theoretical views discussed by Siikala in her 
publications. However, she does not compare her informants’ ideas 
with ideas presented by her colleagues. This is because methodological-
ly, she questions the validity of such comparisons: propositions that 
seem similar to ones we could utter can in fact be considerably differ-
ent from our ways of thinking when uttered within an unfamiliar con-
ceptual framework. If we think we are able to understand them well 
enough right away to compare them with our own beliefs, or to ap-
praise them, we might not just make a mistake, but in fact hinder our 
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own understanding of the differences in question. For this reason, 
ethnographers typically avoid the appraisal of alien knowledge systems. 
The distinctions made by using a case study from Finnish folkloris-
tics as a counterexample are also appropriate when trying to under-
stand the cautionary examples Boghossian has given us: Anyon and 
Zimmerman. The views they have expressed are an example of meth-
odological conceptual relativism rather than "postmodern" epistemic 
relativism. In neither Anyon's nor Zimmerman's work is postmodern 
epistemic relativism running rampant. They do not allow "ideological 
criteria to displace standards of scholarship", as Boghossian (1996) 
fears. Instead, they clearly distinguish archaeological epistemic stand-
ards from the ones followed in the descendant communities with 
which they work, and although they respect the views of the communi-
ties, they make it clear that researchers must stick to their discipline's 
own standards when doing research. 
 
8.4. Critical Subjects: Participatory Research Needs to 
Make Room for Debate 
Critical Subjects continues on the theme of relativistic research practices, 
and connects it to questions related to objectivity. In this paper, I argue 
that as the call for collaboration and participation is becoming com-
mon in cultural research, the practice of avoiding the appraisal of alien 
knowledge systems is becoming unpracticable. 
Participatory methods in anthropology and other fields of cultural 
research aim to turn informants into collaborators or co-authors, and 
often to integrate extra-academic knowledge with academic knowledge. 
These disciplines differ in one respect from the other academic fields 
where participatory and collaborative approaches have become com-
mon. Particularly researchers engaged in ethnography have always in-
teracted with how their informants conceptualise, understand and ex-
plain themselves and the world around them. They have developed a 
theoretical understanding of their informants' knowledge, and estab-
lished research practices through which that knowledge is approached. 
When conducting participatory projects, cultural researchers today 
generally accept the idea of different knowledge systems, and often 
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continue the practice of avoiding the critical appraisal of alien systems 
that is common in ethnography.  
However, if informants are to be treated as collaborators, or ideally 
as colleagues, they become effectively part of the research community. 
Longino (2002) has formulated criteria for evaluating the objectivity of 
research communities. These criteria rest heavily on the idea of effec-
tive peer criticism, and require the reasoning and background assump-
tions of all members of the community to be appraised. Avoiding the 
appraisal of alien knowledge systems is problematic when the alleged 
systems of researcher and researched are in constant contact. In partic-
ipatory research, where researchers work together with extra-academic 
agents who allegedly represent different knowledge systems, avoiding 
appraisal is eventually an untenable practice. 
The avoidance of appraisal is related to two forms of relativism: 
moderate conceptual relativism and "postmodern" epistemic relativism. 
When former informants enter academia themselves, the limits of con-
ceptual relativism become clear. Relativists of this kind would consider 
it a mistake to appraise claims made within another, non-academic 
knowledge system, fearing that such appraisal would be based on a 
mistranslation. Postmodern relativism does not fare any better, even if 
many researchers interested in collaboration and participation have 
been inspired by ideas that could be labelled as instances of it. Unfor-
tunately, such relativism does not really challenge the already familiar 
practice of avoiding the appraisal of alien knowledge systems. It only 
transforms the practice from abstinence to acceptance. The risk is 
recognised in the literature: the uncritical privileging of alternative 
knowledge systems is untenable. If researchers are to integrate extra-
academic knowledge into academic knowledge, they must evaluate it 
(Finnis 2004; Harding 2011). 
The adverse consequences of avoiding appraisal are twofold, de-
pending on the form the practice takes. Researchers can simply avoid 
taking any stand when faced with knowledge claims allegedly based on 
non-academic knowledge systems. This is hardly constructive if the 
aim is to integrate knowledge systems and blur the difference between 
researcher and researched. It sustains the difference between the epis-
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temic communities and shuts the extra-academic agents out of the 
research community.  
The other option is for researchers to support the non-academic 
knowledge system and thus to risk being uncritical. In that case they do 
not pay enough attention to the fact that the better a participatory pro-
ject succeeds, the more clearly the extra-academic agents become part 
of the research community. If the contributions of a part of the com-
munity are not met with the same critical attitude as those of other 
researchers, the objectivity of the entire research community suffers. 
 
8.5. Extra-Academic Transdisciplinarity and Scientific 
Pluralism: What can they learn from each other? 
The paper looks at two bodies of literature in relation to one another. 
Thus far these literatures have proceeded independently and within 
different disciplinary frameworks. One deals with extra-academic 
transdisciplinarity (TD) and is mostly authored by non-philosophers, 
while the other consists of work on scientific pluralism by philoso-
phers. We propose to bring the two bodies of literature in contact with 
one another, paying special attention to the settings in which extra-
academic participation occurs in TD projects. 
The stated aim of extra-academic transdisciplinarity is to tackle 
complex real-life problems by integrating knowledge from many differ-
ent sources. These include not only knowledge produced in different 
academic disciplines, but also varieties of extra-academic knowledge. 
The possibility that integration might turn out to be unfeasible is not 
discussed much in the TD literature, as integration is often seen as the 
sine qua non of TD. In philosophy of science, especially in debates relat-
ed to scientific pluralism, integration has lately been the subject of 
lively discussion. However, here the setting where integration is sup-
posed to happen is purely intra-academic and does not involve signifi-
cant power asymmetries. Ideas developed in this literature thus cannot, 
smoothly and without modification, be transferred to bear on issues in 
a typical extra-academic TD setting. 
Some philosophical advocates of scientific pluralism also favour the 
idea of extra-academic participation in academic research. Briefly put, 
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many pluralists defend the view that scientific and social values should 
be integrated; thus, for instance, Philip Kitcher (2001; 2011) stresses 
the importance of the interests and perspectives of extra-academic 
agents, and wishes to see more democratic knowledge production 
within academia. Moreover, knowledge and epistemic advantages are 
also at stake when philosophers defend the idea of extra-academic 
participation in academic research. Laypeople can be experts on an 
issue researchers wish to study, or they might be able to offer epistemi-
cally important criticisms from their unique standpoint (see Wylie 
2015). 
However, when philosophers discuss extra-academic participation, 
it too is typically thought to occur in a setting we find limited: scientific 
researchers, unlike the extra-academic agents, are taken to have a so-
cially established role as producers of knowledge. In cases where there 
is a power asymmetry, the researchers are taken to be in a position of 
authority in relation to the extra-academic agents. And it is typically 
assumed that there is no irresolvable epistemic conflict between the 
academic and extra-academic agents; rather, their different approaches 
are likely to be reconcilable.  
We will show that in extra-academic TD it is possible, even likely, 
that the power asymmetries between the different participants are 
complex and that some extra-academic agents have established roles as 
producers of knowledge, which has significant consequences for TD 
projects. In addition, the different approaches are not always reconcil-
able. One of the sources of these problems is the notion of knowledge 
systems used in the TD literature. This notion often comes close to an 
anthropological notion of comprehensive cognitive systems, which has 
not been developed for normative epistemological purposes. It differs 
from the notions used by philosophical pluralists, who typically put 
their ideas in terms of theories, models, research approaches and the 
like. In discussions of extra-academic TD, the epistemically non-
normative concept is used in contexts where the epistemic norms, 
values and practices of the different epistemic communities may con-
flict with each other and where normative epistemic assessment is in-
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dispensable. If knowledge systems are to be integrated, they must be 
assessed critically. 
Pluralist views on extra-academic participation are thus far mostly 
concentrated on defending the idea of participation. In actual extra-
academic TD projects, such participation happens in more complicated 
settings than are discussed in the pluralist literature, and this has signif-
icant consequences. The pluralist discussion related to extra-academic 
participation could do more than just concentrate on arguing why it is 
important to give extra-academic agents a role in academic research. It 
is equally important to ask how this can be done well. 
 
9. Concluding remarks 
Ethnographic research practices developed for approaching the 
knowledge systems of informants have been shaped by moderate 
forms of relativism. Insights related particularly to conceptual 
relativism, but also to to cultural, as well as "postmodern" epistemic 
relativism, have pointed ethnographers' research practices in a direction 
where they avoid the appraisal of their informants' knowledge systems. 
Currently these practices are becoming outdated. Avoiding the apprais-
al of alien knowledge systems is no longer as practicable in cultural 
research as it used to be.  
As noted, the underlying premise of this dissertation is that the 
emerging, more democratic forms of research should be objective; for 
instance, values must not replace evidence, and criticism must not be 
ignored (Douglas 2007, Hacking 2015). To assess the objectivity of 
collaborative, participatory and activist research, I have turned my 
attention to the changing research communities, and used an interac-
tive account of objectivity – especially the four norms defined by 
Longino (1990, 2002). 
As extra-academic agents join research teams in participatory pro-
jects, they become part of communities whose interactive objectivity 
can and should be assessed. The contributions of everyone belonging 
to a research community must be met with the same critical attitude, or 
the objectivity of the entire community will suffer. When indigenous 
activist researchers claim to represent indigenous knowledge systems 
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within academia, their work should similarly be approached critically. 
Otherwise the activist researchers will miss valuable criticisms, and the 
interactive objectivity of the larger research community suffers. Avoid-
ing the appraisal of alien knowledge systems is no longer viable. In 
these research approaches, the only epistemically acceptable practice 
towards knowledge systems alien to the academic researchers, is critical 
interaction. 
This dissertation focuses on a phenomenon that affects many fields 
of research, not just the ones examined here. It is common today to 
integrate extra-academic knowledge with scientific or academic 
knowledge, and to give extra-academic agents more active roles in 
research than has been customary. In participatory, collaborative and 
transdisciplinary projects, researchers use artistic knowledge, tacit 
knowledge, indigenous knowledge or the knowledge of "experts by 
experience". Often the aim is to produce policy-relevant results. For 
example, indigenous knowledge is used in the study of climate change 
in the Arctic, and experts by experience participate in projects that aim 
to develop more effective policies in mental health work. It is thus 
important that the results can be trusted. However, it is not obvious 
how objectivity is ensured when the research is partly based on 
knowledge acquired through extra-academic means. 
The philosophical analysis of the "democratisation" of academic 
knowledge production is likely to reveal different questions and prob-
lems in different fields of research. However, there are good reasons to 
pay special attention to cultural research. As is illustrated in the joint 
paper with Mäki (V), similar issues as the ones examined here can also 
arise outside cultural research. This is because cultural research, espe-
cially ethnography, is in a unique position when facing the urge to-
wards more democratic knowledge production. Ethnographers have 
developed a theoretical understanding of their informants’ knowledge 
systems and established research practices through which these are 
approached. These practices have not only begun to collide with new 
demands that arise from the now common call for collaborative and 
participatory research. They also affect the theoretical discussions on 
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collaboration and participation in disciplines that do not have similar 
theoretical resources for approaching extra-academic knowledge. 
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